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Various protocols of quantum cryptography has been presented [1-4]. Some of them can be 
used to transmit secret messages directly[5-7]. In this letter, we present a new kind of quantum 
cryptography protocol for direct transmission of classical and quantum messages based on 
Shamir’s generic protocol on classical message encryption [8]. Though Shamir’s original idea has 
only realization of computational security in classical cryptology and will fall to a 
man-in-the-middle attack, our protocol’s security is theoretical based on properties of quantum 
entanglement and Boolean function, and can resist the man-in-the-middle attack.  
I. Protocol for quantum message transmission 
A quantum message is a sequence of pure state: 
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k Fmmmm ∈= L if we choose kmmm ⊗⊗⊗ L21 as base states. Let 
us consider the secure transmission of a pure state m
m
m∑α . Here the word ‘secure’ means 
1)Eve cannot get the state even when she has controlled the channel; 2)Bob can verify that the 
state really comes from Alice; 3)Alice can verify that the receiver is Bob; 4)Bob know whether the 
state has been changed in the channel. These are so called encryption, identification and 
authentication. Here is the basic encryption protocol for quantum message without authentication: 
1. Alice chooses a n-dimensional Boolean function 
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from Boolean functions of k variables randomly and secretly, and do a computation as 
below: 
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   then sends the state to Bob. 
2. Bob chooses his Boolean function )(xFB independently and randomly, and do a similar 
computation: 
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   then sends it back to Alice. 
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3. Alice do the computation： 
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and sends  
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to Bob again. 
4. Bob do the same computation with his function )(xFB : 
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and get the quantum message in the first quantum register. 
 
II. Protocol for classical message transmission 
Alice prepares the base state m′ in a quantum register of k qubits to represents a 
classical message m ′ of k bits, then transforms it to a superposition state via Hadamard 
transformation: 
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      where )( ii mm′ is the value of the i th bit of message )(mm′ . After that, Alice transmits it 
with the protocol described in the previous section. In the end, Bob should transform the state 
he has received to a base state via Hadamard transformation to get the classical message m′ .  
Let us consider the simplest example for the classical message transmission: Alice want 
to transmit a single bit message ‘0’ to Bob. The process is as below: 
1. Alice chooses 0  to represents ‘0’, and transforms it to a superposition state with 
Hadamard transformation: 
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   here AF  is chosen from 0,1,,)( xxxF =  randomly. It is evident that the computation 
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involved here can be realized by a CNOT gate and a single qubit gate. After the 
computation, Alice sends the two-qubit state to Bob. 
2. Bob computes the Boolean function BF  chosen by himself : 
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   Then Bob sends this three-qubit state back to Alice.  
3. Alice computes AF  and gets 
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   and then sends the state 
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   back to Bob. 
4. Bob computes BF  again and gets  
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Then he do a Hadamard transformation to the first qubit and get 0 state. Because the 
Boolean functions AF  and BF  are chosen randomly and secretly from xxF ,,1,0= , 
the protocol is theoretically secure.  
 
III.  Protocol with personal identification and message authentication 
Suppose Alice and Bob preshare identification keys As  and Bs , here  As  and Bs  
are Boolean functions. We have a protocol that will success against the ‘middle-man attack’ : 
1. Alice prepares the state as below: 
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   and sends it to Bob. 
2. Bob transforms it : 
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   and sends it back to Alice. 
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3. Alice transforms the state and verifies that the quantum message is really coming back 
from Bob: 
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   That is, if the second quantum register is in the state 0 , Alice believe that it really 
comes from Bob, otherwise she stop the protocol, or more safely, process a wrong 
protocol. If Eve pretend to be Alice to communicate with Bob, she can substitute the 
second register with one in the state )(mFE , but she cannot transform the third 
register into )()( msmF AB ⊕ if we choose BA ss ≠ . Finally Alice transforms the 
state to  
         ∑ ⊕
m
IIIABIm
msmFm )()(α ,                                  (17) 
   and sends it to Bob again. 
4. Bob transforms the state as below to get the quantum message coming form Alice: 
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and at the same time, to verify Alice’s legitimacy via measuring the third register. 
 
IV. Discussions and conclusion 
1.  We can find that there are at least other two choices to construct no-key like protocol for 
pure state transmission. The simplest one is Alice and Bob changes the bases directly and 
interactively: 
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Unfortunately, we cannot authenticate the state at all. The other choice is to make use an auxiliary 
register: 
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but still we cannot construct a secure protocol with both encryption and authentication. 
    2.  Suppose Alice and Bob share secret key s, they can use it directly as 
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if s is a random string. If s is a Boolean function, they have at least two other choices: 
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It is easy to find that we have no way to authenticate the message at all. Besides, Eve can get 
information of s by the way of measuring the state in the channel. Our protocol uses AF  and 
BF to protect Alice and Bob’s personal keys As  and Bs .  
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